Dr. Sam Kliger                                                                                    

America Jewish Committee (AJC)

Presentation at Kennan Institute Conference

“The Legacy and Consequences of

Jackson-Vanik: Reassesing Human Rights in 21^st Century Russia”

February 4, 2010

            The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and U.S.-Russian Relations

AJC, established in 1906 out of concern for Jewish pogroms in Russia, has been involved in U.S. – Russia relations for a century.[1]  During 1906-1911, it campaigned successfully for ending of the 1832 Russia-American Commercial Treaty, responding to Russian government discrimination of American Jews by denying to them entry visa simply because they were Jewish.[2]   In the 1950s, AJC sponsored comprehensive studies on the effect of Soviet rule on the life of Jewish communities.  Since 1964, AJC has been deeply involved in the Soviet Jewry movement and, in the early 1970s, advocated for Congressional passage of the JVA.

The chain of events leading to the J-V amendment is well known.  When, in 1972, the Soviet regime imposed heavy “tax on education” on those individuals wishing to emigrate, protests from the free world immediately followed.  By the end of 1972, it became clear to the Kremlin that it would not get any favorable trade deals as long as the “education tax” was in force.  The Politburo met for a special session on March 20, 1973, where Brezhnev spoke furiously about the “education tax” that led to “a campaign around the Jackson Amendment and around the bill on granting us Most-Favored-Nation status.”[3]  The battle over the proposed amendment between Nixon administration and the U.S. Congress continued during 1973 and 1974 and resulted in approval by both houses. It was signed into law by President Ford on January 3, 1975.

The provisions of the amendment can be summarized as prohibiting favorable commercial relations with a non-market country that forbids or severely restricts free emigration of its citizens by denying them the right or opportunity to emigrate, imposing more than a nominal tax on emigration, or punishing them for their desire to emigrate.

Like many other Jews considering emigration from the Soviet Union, I was enthusiastic about the amendment, hoping that now the emigration process would be simplified.  But the Kremlin reacted strongly and even suspended repayment of the Soviet Lend-Lease debt to the U.S. remaining from the World War II.  And though the “education tax” was not re-implemented, Jewish emigration fell dramatically from 35,000 in 1973 to 20,000 in 1974 and to only 13,000 in 1975.[4]    Many Jews, myself included, were afraid to apply for exit visas out of fear of denial and the negative consequences one would encounter by daring to apply for emigration, including losing one’s job and social and professional ostracism.  While hope improved again when, after the adoption of the 35-nations Helsinki Accords of 1975, emigration numbers went up a little, tens of thousands of Soviet Jews became “refuseniks.”   Among many others, I applied for an exit visa in the earlier 1980 with hope that the window of opportunity would be open in preparation for the Moscow Olympics and with fear that it would be closed afterwards.  The worst scenario has realized, and the door was almost completely shut in 1980, after Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.  I, along with thousands of other Soviet Jews, became a “refusenik” – in my case for ten years—with all the miserable consequences and stigmas related to that status.

The amendment played a positive role as an important and specific tool pressing the Soviet Union to allow people to emigrate freely, and was instrumental in the more general goal of improving the human rights conditions of the Soviet people.  Though in the short run, the JVA led to more restrictions on emigration and reduced the flow of emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, in the long run, it was a tool in the struggle for freedom and basic rights for the Soviet people, and thus contributed to the end of Communist rule and the eventual collapse of the USSR.  Anatoly Dobrynin, former USSR ambassador to the U.S., writes in his book that “our biggest mistake was to stand on pride and not let as many Jews go as wanted to leave… Instead, our leadership turned it into a test of wills that we eventually lost.”[5]

Now, 35 years since the JVA was signed into law, it is time to reevaluate the triangle of human rights issue, the U.S. – Russian relations, and the JVA in the context of both.  

First, fully acknowledging the fact that there are serious violations of human rights in contemporary Russia, there is also a need to acknowledge Russia as a new state and a new player on international arena, a state which is not identical or similar to the Soviet Union.  It would be inaccurate to equate today’s Russia with the Soviet Union and to apply approaches similar to those used in dealing with the Soviet Union.  Similarities between Russia and the USSR, that some scholars, journalists, and human rights activists emphasize, are rather superficial.  Let’s look at a bigger picture.  1) State-sponsored anti-Semitism in Russia simply does not exist; 2) Freedom of immigration is not an issue for the last 20 years; 3) With some minor restrictions and state’s support for the Russian Orthodox Church, religion in Russia can be freely exercised; 4) While it is true that most of the media, and especially national TV channels, are under state control, some basic elements of freedom of press exist (Novaya Gazeta – independent newspaper, often critical of the government;  Vremya Novostey – liberal small-circulation newspaper; Nezavisimaya Gazeta – privately owned newspaper; Kommersant; radio Ekho Moskvy –Gazprom owned, editorially independent station; Gazeta.Ru – privately owned web site, often critical of the government; many of the book publishing houses, and most importantly the Internet – are examples).[6] 5) While many of the big corporations are also controlled by the government, small and middle-size business enterprises are privately owned and operated (with corruption as an imminent factor) and people explore the right of ownership and exercise entrepreneurship;  6) With all the negativities of the authoritarian regime of Putin-Medvedev, majority of people in Russia support the sense of “stability and order” associated with this regime (Putin’s approval rating fluctuated between 70% and 85% during all 8 years of his two terms rule, and Medvedev enjoyed a similar rating during 2009, according to the most independent Levada Polling Center)[7]; 7) With some notorious restrictions and pressure that the Russian government applied to NGO’s, many domestic and international human rights groups successfully operate, though in sometimes hostile environment;  8) On international arena, though Russia is still nourishing its imperial ambitions (of which Georgia is a current example) and playing tricky games on some issues like Iranian nuclear aspirations, it is willing to cooperate on some important problems such as arms control, space exploration, and nuclear nonproliferation.  Russia—and this is now widely recognized—is not a strategic threat to the U.S.; it is rather an underestimated natural ally.   

To summarize and to put it in historical perspective, Russia is less anti-Semitic, more open and West-oriented, less oppressive, more supported by its people, and freer than ever in its 1000-years history (there may be some exceptions, like a short period between February and October of 1917, and probably a short period during Eltsin’s first term, in 1994-1995).  To put it in geographical perspectives, Russia is still a gravitational political and economic galactic to its Western and South-Eastern neighbors.

U.S. needs Russian cooperation in many important areas, most urgently in Iranian uranium enrichment program and in a broader issue of nuclear nonproliferation and energy security.  There is a need to cooperate in the global fight against terrorism, from which Russia suffers along with the U.S.   The U.S. needs Russia’s assistance in its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  And the list goes on.  J-V Amendment is seen by the Russians as a constant irritant, and as a Cold War relic that undermines Russia’s prestige as permanent member of the UN Security Council, as Middle East Quartet Member and in a broader international arena. 

Moral and Pragmatic Issues:

1)      Some Communist countries, including China and Hungary, were granted the Most Favorable Nation status by the Congress as early as 1979.  Even within the first year of Carter’s presidency, officials of his administration asked Congress to alter the JVA,[8]  and attempts were made in the late 1970s to exempt the Soviet Union from the J-V restrictions as emigration from the USSR increased in 1978 and 1979.  The first six-month waiver was granted to the Soviets in December of 1990 by President George H.W. Bush, when emigration reached the rate of 12,000 per month.[9]  After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia and other successor states of the FSU were granted the Most-Favorite-Nation Status on an annual basis.  In 1994, President Clinton formally recognized Russia’s “full compliance” with the J-V provisions, and in 2002, President George W. Bush asked Congress to legislate the exemption of Russia from the JVA.   Thus, for almost 30 years, JVA was interpreted and widely recognized by the U.S. officials, NGOs, and Jewish groups as directly related to the right of emigration from the Soviet Union.  Since the early 1990s, it became obvious that free emigration from Russia and the republics of the Former Soviet Union is an established fact and that JVA is irrelevant as a tool invented to ensure the basic right of emigration.

2)      During the late 1990s and throughout the last decade, a new concept emerged that connected JVA to a broader spectrum of political, economic, and human rights issues.  More and more new demands to the J-V provisions were arbitrarily added.  Some journalists, scholars, NGOs, and governmental agencies connected J-V repeal for Russia with a) democratization of the political regime in Russia; b) human rights violations, especially in Chechnya and the North Caucasus region; c) the free market economy.   In other words, in order to get rid of the Cold War relic amendment that speaks primarily of the right of emigration, Russia now must demonstrate its democratic nature, become a full-fledged market economy, and a shining example for human rights.  Such demands are unfair and unjust, especially given the fact that no specific measurable criteria were suggested.   To many Russians, these unspecified demands simply indicate that no matter how well they comply with U.S. demands, the new restrictions will inevitably be imposed to keep Russia on the hook forever.  This perception is widespread among the Russian political and intellectual elite.  During a number of AJC’s meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in recent years that I attended, he complained about JVA in various ways and was specifically and ironically irritated with the continuing attempts to connect the JVA repeal with Russia’s purchasing of American poultry.[10]  Moreover, Russia uses the J-V as a case study by communicating to other countries the notion that the U.S. will never be satisfied by those who comply with their demands, and that U.S. demands will never stop.  This not only causes harm to U.S. – Russia relations, but also to American relations with other countries, undermining U.S. efforts to apply sanctions.

3)       In addition, seven countries of the FSU – including Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine – where democracy, free market, and human rights are still in question, have “graduated” from the amendment in recent years.  As for Ukraine, American Jewish Committee advocated strongly before the U.S. Congress in 2005 to repeal JVA for Ukraine with the hope that Ukraine, after the Orange Revolution, would firmly stay on a democratic path, despite the reported facts of serious corruption and multiple anti-Semitic incidents (one of the major state-licensed private universities, MAUP, has been involved in anti-Semitic publications, lectures, and propaganda).   Many in Russia and outside see this as applying double standards and a discriminatory approach by abolishing some FSU counties with no free market economy and human rights violations from J-V amendment while keeping Russia on the hook.    

4)      Most major Jewish organizations in Russia, such as the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), Russian Jewish Congress, Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities (KEROOR), Council of Jewish Organizations (VAAD), and Euro-Asian Jewish Congress (EAJC) speak in favor of the J-V repeal for Russia.  In my recent conversations with their leaders, they expressed the notion that “graduating” Russia from J-V amendment would be to the benefit of U.S. – Russia relations.

5)      Some human rights groups and NGOs in Russia like the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights and the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation also express the need for abolishing J-V and suggest that such repeal would contribute to the improvement of U.S. – Russia relations and would enhance the development of civil society in Russia.  To ensure continuing emigration freedom and improve the human rights situation in Russia, J-V Amendment could be replaced by cooperation between American and Russian NGOs that would place the amendment’s provisions under civil society control.  A move to abolish the amendment would be considered a serious step toward the new approach of “re-setting” relations between the U.S. and Russia, and would contribute to the efforts of the newly established Obama-Medvedev Commission and particularly to its Civil Society Working Group led by Dr. Michael McFaul and Vladislav Surkov, which first met here in Washington last week.  This Working Group, for instance, in cooperation with American and Russian NGOs can take control of the amendment’s provisions.

6)      And last but not least, let us turn to the human “products” of the amendment, those tens of thousands of Soviet Jews and non-Jews alike, who managed to immigrate to the United States, Israel and other countries as a direct or indirect result of the amendment.   Many Russian-Jewish grassroots and broader Russian-speaking communities in the U.S. support “graduating” Russia from the JVA. 

The dilemma of choosing between what is morally right and the pragmatism of “realpolitik” has been always on U.S agenda vis-a-vie the Soviet Union (Jackson-Vanik was a good example of this moral stand as was Ronald Reagan’s calling the Soviet Union an Evil Empire) and is a part of political and public discourse now.  In evaluating of the JVA today, this dilemma does not exist, since “graduating” Russia from the amendment would be both fair and pragmatic.