American Jewish Committee (AJC)
Presentation at Kennan
Institute Conference
“The Legacy and
Consequences of
Jackson-Vanik: Reassesing
Human Rights in 21st Century Russia”
February 4, 2010
The Jackson-Vanik
Amendment and U.S.-Russian Relations
AJC,
established in 1906 out of concern for Jewish pogroms in Russia,
has been involved in U.S. – Russia relations
for a century. During 1906-1911, it campaigned
successfully for ending of the 1832 Russia-American Commercial Treaty,
responding to Russian government discrimination of American Jews by denying to
them entry visa simply because they were Jewish. In the 1950s, AJC sponsored
comprehensive studies on the effect of Soviet rule on the life of Jewish
communities. Since 1964,
AJC has been deeply involved in the Soviet Jewry movement and, in the early
1970s, advocated for Congressional passage of the JVA.
The chain of events
leading to the J-V amendment is well known. When, in 1972, the Soviet regime
imposed heavy “tax on education” on those individuals wishing to emigrate,
protests from the free world immediately followed. By the end of 1972, it became clear to
the Kremlin that it would not get any favorable trade deals as long as the
“education tax” was in force. The
Politburo met for a special session on March 20, 1973, where Brezhnev spoke
furiously about the “education tax” that led to “a campaign around the Jackson
Amendment and around the bill on granting us Most-Favored-Nation status.”The battle over the proposed amendment between Nixon
administration and the U.S. Congress continued during 1973 and 1974 and
resulted in approval by both houses. It was signed into law by President Ford
on January 3, 1975.
The provisions of the
amendment can be summarized as prohibiting favorable commercial relations with
a non-market country that forbids or severely restricts free emigration of its
citizens by denying them the right or opportunity to emigrate, imposing more
than a nominal tax on emigration, or punishing them for their desire to
emigrate.
Like many other Jews
considering emigration from the Soviet Union, I was
enthusiastic about the amendment, hoping that now the emigration process would
be simplified. But the
Kremlin reacted strongly and even suspended repayment of the Soviet Lend-Lease
debt to the U.S. remaining
from the World War II. And
though the “education tax” was not re-implemented, Jewish emigration fell
dramatically from 35,000 in 1973 to 20,000 in 1974 and to only 13,000 in 1975. Many
Jews, myself included, were afraid to apply for exit visas out of fear of
denial and the negative consequences one would encounter by daring to apply for
emigration, including losing one’s job and social and professional ostracism. While hope improved again when, after
the adoption of the 35-nations Helsinki Accords of 1975, emigration numbers
went up a little, tens of thousands of Soviet Jews became “refuseniks.” Among many others, I applied for
an exit visa in the earlier 1980 with hope that the window of opportunity would
be open in preparation for the Moscow Olympics and with fear that it would be
closed afterwards. The
worst scenario has realized, and the door was almost completely shut in 1980,
after Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. I, along with thousands of other
Soviet Jews, became a “refusenik” – in my case for ten years—with all the
miserable consequences and stigmas related to that status.
The amendment played a
positive role as an important and specific tool pressing the Soviet
Union to
allow people to emigrate freely, and was instrumental in the more general goal
of improving the human rights conditions of the Soviet people. Though in the short run, the JVA led
to more restrictions on emigration and reduced the flow of emigration of Jews
from the Soviet Union, in the long run, it was a tool in the struggle for
freedom and basic rights for the Soviet people, and thus contributed to the end
of Communist rule and the eventual collapse of the USSR. Anatoly Dobrynin, former USSRambassador
to the U.S.,
writes in his book that “our biggest mistake was to stand on pride and not let
as many Jews go as wanted to leave… Instead, our leadership turned it into a
test of wills that we eventually lost.”
Now, 35 years since the
JVA was signed into law, it is time to reevaluate the triangle of human rights
issue, the U.S. –
Russian relations, and the JVA in the context of both.
First, fully acknowledging
the fact that there are serious violations of human rights in contemporary Russia,
there is also a need to acknowledge Russia as a new state
and a new player on international arena, a state which is not identical or
similar to the Soviet
Union. It
would be inaccurate to equate today’s Russia with the Soviet
Union and to apply approaches similar to those used in dealing with the Soviet
Union. Similarities
between Russia and the USSR,
that some scholars, journalists, and human rights activists emphasize, are
rather superficial. Let’s
look at a bigger picture. 1)
State-sponsored anti-Semitism in Russia simply does not exist; 2) Freedom of
immigration is not an issue for the last 20 years; 3) With some minor
restrictions and state’s support for the Russian Orthodox Church, religion in
Russia can be freely exercised; 4) While it is true that most of the media, and
especially national TV channels, are under state control, some basic elements
of freedom of press exist (Novaya Gazeta – independent newspaper, often
critical of the government; Vremya
Novostey – liberal small-circulation newspaper; Nezavisimaya Gazeta – privately
owned newspaper; Kommersant; radio Ekho Moskvy –Gazprom owned, editorially
independent station; Gazeta.Ru – privately owned web site, often critical of
the government; many of the book publishing houses, and most importantly the
Internet – are examples). 5) While many of the big corporations
are also controlled by the government, small and middle-size business
enterprises are privately owned and operated (with corruption as an imminent
factor) and people explore the right of ownership and exercise
entrepreneurship; 6) With
all the negativities of the authoritarian regime of Putin-Medvedev, majority of
people in Russia support the sense of “stability and order” associated with
this regime (Putin’s approval rating fluctuated between 70% and 85% during all
8 years of his two terms rule, and Medvedev enjoyed a similar rating during
2009, according to the most independent Levada Polling Center); 7) With some
notorious restrictions and pressure that the Russian government applied to
NGO’s, many domestic and international human rights groups successfully
operate, though in sometimes hostile environment; 8) On international arena,
though Russia is still nourishing its imperial ambitions (of which Georgia is a
current example) and playing tricky games on some issues like Iranian nuclear
aspirations, it is willing to cooperate on some important problems such as arms
control, space exploration, and nuclear nonproliferation. Russia—and
this is now widely recognized—is not a strategic threat to the U.S.;
it is rather an underestimated natural ally.
To summarize and to put
it in historical perspective, Russia is less anti-Semitic, more open and
West-oriented, less oppressive, more supported by its people, and freer than
ever in its 1000-years history (there may be some exceptions, like a short
period between February and October of 1917, and probably a short period during
Eltsin’s first term, in 1994-1995). To put it in geographical
perspectives, Russia is
still a gravitational political and economic galactic to its Western and
South-Eastern neighbors.
U.S. needs Russian cooperation in many important areas, most urgently
in Iranian uranium enrichment program and in a broader issue of nuclear
nonproliferation and energy security. There
is a need to cooperate in the global fight against terrorism, from which Russia suffers along
with the U.S. The U.S. needs Russia’s
assistance in its efforts in Afghanistanand Iraq. And the list goes on. J-V Amendment is seen by the Russians
as a constant irritant, and as a Cold War relic that undermines Russia’s
prestige as permanent member of the UN Security Council, as Middle East Quartet
Member and in a broader international arena.
Moral and Pragmatic
Issues:
1) Some Communist countries, including China and Hungary,
were granted the Most Favorable Nation status by the Congress as early as
1979. Even within the first
year of Carter’s presidency, officials of his administration asked Congress to
alter the JVA, and attempts were made in the
late 1970s to exempt the Soviet Union from the J-V restrictions as emigration
from the USSR increased
in 1978 and 1979. The first
six-month waiver was granted to the Soviets in December of 1990 by President
George H.W. Bush, when emigration reached the rate of 12,000 per month. After the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991, Russia and
other successor states of the FSU were granted the Most-Favorite-Nation Status
on an annual basis. In
1994, President Clinton formally recognized Russia’s
“full compliance” with the J-V provisions, and in 2002, President George W.
Bush asked Congress to legislate the exemption of Russia from
the JVA. Thus, for
almost 30 years, JVA was interpreted and widely recognized by the U.S. officials, NGOs,
and Jewish groups as directly related to the right of emigration from the Soviet
Union. Since
the early 1990s, it became obvious that free emigration from Russia and
the republics of the Former Soviet Union is an established fact and that JVA is irrelevant as a tool invented to ensure the basic
right of emigration.
2) During the late 1990s and throughout
the last decade, a new concept emerged that connected JVA to a broader spectrum
of political, economic, and human rights issues. More and more new demands to the J-V
provisions were arbitrarily added. Some
journalists, scholars, NGOs, and governmental agencies connected J-V repeal for Russia with a)
democratization of the political regime in Russia;
b) human rights violations, especially in Chechnya and the North
Caucasus region;
c) the free market economy. In
other words, in order to get rid of the Cold War relic amendment that speaks
primarily of the right of emigration, Russia now
must demonstrate its democratic nature, become a full-fledged market economy,
and a shining example for human rights. Such
demands are unfair and unjust, especially given the fact that no specific
measurable criteria were suggested. To many Russians, these unspecified
demands simply indicate that no matter how well they comply with U.S. demands, the new
restrictions will inevitably be imposed to keep Russia on
the hook forever. This
perception is widespread among the Russian political and intellectual
elite. During a number of
AJC’s meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in recent years that I
attended, he complained about JVA in various ways and was specifically and
ironically irritated with the continuing attempts to connect the JVA repeal
with Russia’s
purchasing of American poultry. Moreover, Russia uses the J-V as a
case study by communicating to other countries the notion that the U.S. will never be
satisfied by those who comply with their demands, and that U.S. demands
will never stop. This not
only causes harm to U.S. – Russia relations, but
also to American relations with other countries, undermining U.S. efforts
to apply sanctions.
3) In addition, seven countries of
the FSU – including Georgia, Kyrgyzstan,
and Ukraine –
where democracy, free market, and human rights are still in question, have
“graduated” from the amendment in recent years. As for Ukraine, American Jewish
Committee advocated strongly before the U.S. Congress in 2005 to repeal JVA for
Ukraine with the hope that Ukraine, after the Orange Revolution, would firmly
stay on a democratic path, despite the reported facts of serious corruption and
multiple anti-Semitic incidents (one of the major state-licensed private
universities, MAUP, has been involved in anti-Semitic publications, lectures,
and propaganda). Many
in Russia and outside see
this as applying double standards and a discriminatory approach by abolishing
some FSU counties with no free market economy and human rights violations from
J-V amendment while keeping Russia on
the hook.
4) Most major Jewish organizations in Russia,
such as the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), Russian Jewish
Congress, Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities (KEROOR),
Council of Jewish Organizations (VAAD), and Euro-Asian Jewish Congress (EAJC)
speak in favor of the J-V repeal for Russia. In my recent conversations with their
leaders, they expressed the notion that “graduating” Russia from J-V
amendment would be to the benefit of U.S. – Russia relations.
5) Some human rights groups and NGOs in
Russia like the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights and the Civic Chamber of the
Russian Federation also express the need for abolishing J-V and suggest that
such repeal would contribute to the improvement of U.S. – Russia relations and
would enhance the development of civil society in Russia. To ensure continuing emigration
freedom and improve the human rights situation in Russia,
J-V Amendment could be replaced by cooperation between American and Russian
NGOs that would place the amendment’s provisions under civil society
control. A move to abolish
the amendment would be considered a serious step toward the new approach of
“re-setting” relations between the U.S. and Russia,
and would contribute to the efforts of the newly established Obama-Medvedev
Commission and particularly to its Civil Society Working Group led by Dr.
Michael McFaul and Vladislav Surkov, which first met here in Washington last
week. This Working Group, for
instance, in cooperation with American and Russian NGOs can take control of the
amendment’s provisions.
6) And last but not least, let us turn to
the human “products” of the amendment, those tens of thousands of Soviet Jews
and non-Jews alike, who managed to immigrate to the United
States, Israel and
other countries as a direct or indirect result of the amendment. Many Russian-Jewish grassroots and
broader Russian-speaking communities in the U.S. support
“graduating” Russia from
the JVA.
The dilemma of choosing
between what is morally right and the pragmatism of “realpolitik” has been
always on U.S agenda vis-a-vie the Soviet Union (Jackson-Vanik was a good
example of this moral stand as was Ronald Reagan’s calling the Soviet Union an
Evil Empire) and is a part of political and public discourse now. In evaluating of the JVA today, this
dilemma does not exist, since “graduating” Russia from the amendment would be
both fair and pragmatic.
See: David A. Harris. A Century of Involvement. AJC and Russian Jewry. American
Jewish Year Book 2007, Vol. 107 (New York:
American Jewish Committee, December 2007).
